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“The nations were caught in a trap … a trap from which there was, and has been, no exit”. 




The crisis in Ukraine is a symptom rather than the cause of the broader crisis in European 
security and global order. In the 25 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the end 
of the Cold War in that year, none of the fundamental problems of European security were 
resolved, giving rise to the quarter-century of the cold peace, which in 2014 gave way to a 
renewed period of confrontation that assumed the form of a Second Cold War. Two 
fundamentally logical ways of understanding European order were at work, both rational in 
their own terms but rendered irrational when seen in the larger context of the challenge of 
creating a viable security order in a continent that has been so often ravaged by war. In other 
words, the logical is not always the most rational. As in the incompatible logics that led to 
war in 1914, it is not clear how the post-Cold War logical traps can be escaped. The 
perspective of alternative rationalities may provide an explanation of the logical traps, if not 




The problem of competing rationalities has long been identified as a central factor provoking 
the deterioration in relations between Russia and the European Union (EU) (Averre 2009), 
but the question can be reformulated.  
 On the one side there is the logic of expansion. This made perfect sense from the 
perspective of those who came to be seen as the ‘victors’ at the end of the Cold War. The 
long-term adversary not only renounced the ideology in whose name the struggle against 
capitalist democracy been waged, but two years later the homeland of revolutionary socialism 
disintegrated. This really did look like ‘the end of history’, with no sustained ideological 
alternative to capitalist modernity on offer. The expansive dynamic of the victorious West, 
moreover, was welcomed and embraced by much of the former Soviet ‘empire’ in Eastern 
Europe, and some of the post-Soviet states even aspired to join the institutions of victorious 
modernity, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the EU. Together these two 
organisations became the core of what at this time was rebranded as the Liberal International 
Order (LIO). This order, buttressed by its associated economic and cultural globalisation, 
offered an era of peace and prosperity, with state interests subordinated to the larger logic of 
multilateralism and rules-based order. If the issue was simply the enlargement of an impartial 
and universal normative order, then some of the later problems may have been avoided. 
However, at the heart of that order there was a hegemonic power system that was far from 
impartial and universal. The core of the LIO was a particular power system led by the United 
States, with its major multilateral manifestation, NATO, firmly part of that order. In other 
words, the LIO was a particular power system that not only claimed to be universal but it 
even presented itself as synonymous with order itself (Sakwa 2017a). 
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From the outset, the logic of expansion was opposed by Russia, the continuer state to 
the Soviet Union. Even in the last days of the USSR, the architect of perestroika, Mikhail 
Gorbachev, considered the end of the Cold War a mutual victory – the triumph of the New 
Political Thinking (NPT) that had long been nurtured in various academic institutes and think 
tanks, and of common sense (English 2000).  
 
The logic of expansion was countered by the logic of transformation, the view that 
the end of the Cold War offered a unique opportunity to move beyond ideological 
confrontation between and within states. The idea of revolutionary socialism and class war 
would give way to a politics of reconciliation and all-class development. The logic of 
transformation encompassed a move away from hair-trigger nuclear deterrence (mutually 
assured destruction) and thus to broader arms control agreements. In Europe there would be a 
new pan-continental security and development order, designated the Common European 
Home by Gorbachev but later described by Vladimir Putin as Greater Europe. This was to be 
a house with many rooms, as Gorbachev (1989) described it; in other words, with a range of 
social systems but united in the desire for a new peace order to govern from Lisbon to 
Vladivostok. 
The tension between these two logical systems gave way in 2014 to outright 
confrontation. Realists argue that there was no reason for the powerful West to make any 
serious concessions to the much weaker Russia (Wohlforth and Zubok 2017). This was the 
logic of power, and in the prevailing conditions, it was perfectly rational. However, for a way 
of thinking that is focused on power balances and capabilities, the advocates of expansion 
were remarkably negligent about the power consequences of their actions. Power is never an 
absolute but it is relational. An action on one side will have consequences on the other side, 
including various asymmetric responses. The structure of the international system is 
important, but even here there is room for interpretation about the operative model. Russia 
and its allies (notably China) believe that the international system is bigger than any 
particular order contained within it (above all the LIO), with the United Nations and other 
multilateral global bodies (notably the Bretton Woods institutions and the World Trade 
Organisation); whereas partisans of the LIO believe that their particular order is universal and 
applicable globally. Realists see the whole system governed by the rules of hegemony in an 
anarchical system, but this can be accompanied by ‘offshore balancing’ and thus avoiding 
direct and permanent confrontation with residual powers such as Russia (Mearsheimer 
2001/2014). 
Russian foreign policy in the post-communist era moved from the eager embrace of 
the West in the early 1990s, to a rather more cautious period of ‘competitive coexistence’ in 
the Yevgeny Primakov years in the late 1990s. Putin’s ‘new realism’ from 2000 returned to 
elements of the transformation advocated by Gorbachev, although combined with less of his 
NPT internationalism and more sovereign internationalism. Putin tried to find a new way to 
reconcile the competing logics, and despite his increasingly bitter condemnation of what he 
believed to be the bad faith of the West, notably in his Munich Security Conference speech in 
February 2007 (Putin 2007), believed that some sort of cooperative modus vivendi could be 
achieved. However, the West’s intervention in Libya in 2011 was the last straw, and put an 
end not only to Dmitry Medvedev’s chances of a second term but also to the whole 
intellectual basis of the new realism. Instead, the Putin who returned to the Kremlin in 2012 
no longer believed in the possibility of deep cooperation with the Western powers. This does 
not mean that Russia became a revisionist power. Instead, it was neo-revisionist: challenging 
the practices of the West, but defending the autonomy of the international system as a whole. 
This is the ‘neo’ part of the qualified revisionism pursued by Russia since 2012. Russia is not 
out to subvert the West but to change it – to try to make it behave according to the logic of 
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international law as formulated in the original Cold War rather than the logic of expansive 
ambitions that came to predominate in the post-Cold War years. 
Russia defends the idea of conservative (or sovereign) internationalism, in which 
states compete and the balance of power is important, but this is tempered by international 
law and organisations, above all the UN. This is what gives agency, in the form of Putin’s 
leadership, not only room for manoeuvre but also a normative basis on which to counter the 
logic of expansion. However, the extraordinary ambition of the expanding Atlantic power 
system after 1989, and even more so in its LIO guise, meant that ultimately the normative or 
institutional scope for innovation remained remarkably limited. As Fyodor Lukyanov notes, 
the solid post-war [1945] system (although not without moments of dramatic crisis) has now 
entered its finale: “The period of 1989-1991 did not destroy the model that emerged after 
World War II but deformed it” particularly because of the disappearance of the second centre. 
“The previous world order has not been replaced with something else, nor has it collapsed”, 
and instead it has begun to crumble (Lukyanov 2019). In other words, from the Russian 
perspective, the expansive ambitions of the Atlantic power system after 1989 eroded even the 
modicum of order that had prevailed until then. Russia has repeatedly called for “the creation 
of a European international security system”, although it is “well aware that it is unlikely to 
gain even the hypothetical support of its European partners” (Bordachev 2020). 
Max Weber’s distinction between formal and substantive rationality theoretically 
offers an escape from logical traps. Formal rationality mainly refers to rational calculation 
determined by rules, regulations, and laws to maximise profitability, and is often negligent of 
humanity. The model that dominates in the Western industrial world is one in which action 
has a consistent structure, and its elements point in one direction. In substantive rationality, 
the choice of means to ends is guided by a set of human values. It concerns several instead of 
final ends, with the focus on the values that guide people in their daily lives. Substantive 
rationality is a manifestation of a person’s capacity for value-rational action. For our 
purposes, in International Relations theory, realism is very good at developing the logic of 
formal rationality in the behaviour of states (notably, the works of John Mearsheimer), 
whereas constructivism deals in neither logic nor rationality but emotions and constructed 
identities. Liberal internationalism deals well with normative and value issues in foreign 
policy, but ultimately fails to appreciate the question of power and identity in international 
politics. What this means for us is that the formal rationality (termed logical thinking in this 
paper) may lead to one set of conclusions in all three main schools of International Relations, 
but lack the larger human perspectives that govern substantive rationality. 
 
The Ukrainian syndrome 
 
This is the context in which the Ukraine crisis unfolded. The two models of post-Cold War 
international order came into confrontation, and were then ‘weaponised’ by competing 
domestic models of Ukrainian development. The division between the more ‘pro-Western’ 
social forces in the West of the country and the more ‘pro-Russian’ inclinations in the East 
and the South have long been apparent through differential voting patterns (D’Anieri 2019). 
It is hardly surprising that Ukraine is at the centre of the struggle between logic and 
rationality, since ‘nearly all major efforts at establishing a durable post-Cold War order on 
the Eurasian continent have foundered on the shoals of Ukraine. For it is in Ukraine that the 
disconnect between triumphalist end-of-history delusions and the ongoing realities of great-
power competition can be seen in its starkest form’ (Plokhy and Sarotte 2020, p. 81). The 




On the one side, the monist model stresses the development of a culturally distinctive 
and politically assertive form of Ukrainian nationalism. This is not the same as the integral 
nationalism of earlier years, although it draws on the legacy of Stepan Bandera, the founder 
of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and Roman Shukhevich, the creator of 
the Ukrainian Partisan Army (UPA). Monist neo-nationalists argue that there is some sort of 
historically coherent autonomous essence to the Ukrainian nation that needs to be sculpted 
out of the larger East Slavic and Russophone block. This neo-nationalist approach sought 
hegemony over state and nation building in the post-Soviet years. It is neo-nationalist to the 
extent that its nationalism is moderated by civic inclusivity. Although its avowedly 
nationalist wing prioritises a single-minded vision of Ukraine, the country has been generous 
to its minorities. The starkest representation of the neo-nationalist monist approach was 
embodied in the 1996 constitution, which gave legal force to Ukraine as a politically mono-
lingual country, although the use of other languages was recognised in non-political spheres. 
Thus, all documentation and official records are in the one language, even though a very 
large proportion of the population is multilingual, with about 20 percent predominantly 
Russian-speaking. zzz 
The ideology of monist neo-nationalism is restitutive, seeking to restore perceived 
earlier distortions of Ukrainian national development. This conforms to classic patterns of 
post-colonial development, which also predominated in Estonia and Latvia. However, post-
colonial identities by definition are hybrid, whereas in the Ukrainian case hybridity is 
tolerated at the cultural level, but was not given adequate constitutional expression. Post-
communist Ukraine offered citizenship to all those living in Ukraine at the time of 
independence, but an exclusionary and didactic dynamic has been at work. This intensified in 
response to developmental and political failures, and was radicalised at the time of the 
Orange Revolution in late 2004, and even became militarized as a result of the Euromaidan 
revolution in 2014 (Katchanovski 2020). The loss of Crimea and the war in the Donbas 
endowed this militant neo-nationalism with a crusading edge that in the Petro Poroshenko 
years (2014-19) saw a campaign against Soviet and Russian historical and cultural legacies. 
The Ukraine case demonstrates that civic nationalism can be as exclusivist as ethnocultural 
nationalism (Zhuravlev and Ishchenko 2020). Thus, today monist neo-nationalism has 
become institutionalised and greatly constrains the room for manoeuvre by the leadership. It 
is now presented as the only authentic form of Ukrainian development (Sakwa 2017b). 
Concessions to the Donbas insurgency are seen as betrayal, and the war is defined as Russian 
aggression, and thus effectively an inter-state war.  
There is, however, another side to Ukrainian state development, although since 2014 
it has been greatly eclipsed. The monist neo-nationalist interpretation of Ukrainian national 
identity is challenged by the pluralists. They draw on post-colonial theory to argue that a 
hybrid and heterogeneous nation is something to be celebrated, on the model of many other 
countries and territories that have a multiplicity of histories and identities. In Wales and 
Canada, linguistic and territorial diversity have been constitutional in form. Pluralists stress 
the multiple character of Ukrainian state and national development over the centuries, which 
in the 20th century was reinforced by a high degree of territorial contingency. Ukraine is one 
of the few countries that resist giving constitutional expression to its diversity. Until 2014, 
Ukraine was very tolerant of other languages and identities, but the radicalisation of monist 
neo-nationalism after 2014 has pushed this to its limits and exposed the dangers of the lack of 
constitutional protection for other cultural and linguistic identities. Toleration is no substitute 
for the transformative constitutional incorporation of diversity. With a history of unstable and 
typically disastrous attempts at creating an independent Ukraine, concern about territorial 
integrity and national coherence is understandable. However, radical neo-nationalism 
alienated the population of Crimea and provoked the revolt in the East. 
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The tension between monist neo-nationalist and pluralist interpretations of Ukrainian 
national identity gave rise to ‘the Ukraine syndrome’, clashing interpretations of what it 
means to be Ukrainian. The syndrome shaped the debates over Ukrainian state development 
after 1991, and the tensions that it reflects were amplified by the larger European divisions in 
the post-Cold War years. The tension between the monist neo-nationalist and pluralist models 
of state development was exacerbated by the larger division between expansive and 
transformative models of European international politics. International conflict was 





The Minsk impasse 
 
The Ukraine syndrome has domestic and international components, and the combination of 
the two creates a ‘wicked’ problem in which the various dimensions reinforce each other, and 
where there is no simple primary cause susceptible to resolution. The problem is multi-
dimensional, and thus the solution will likewise have to incorporate multiple factors. Wicked 
problems require holistic solutions, but in our case existential issues of identity, even national 
survival, are at play, and no clear resolution can be found. 
 The Minsk II Accord of February 2015 stabilised the conflict and at first appeared to 
offer a route out of the crisis. The agreement stipulates, inter alia, that elections are to be held 
in the two breakaway republics (the Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s 
Republic) before control of the territories is returned to Ukraine. In the event, the Accord 
only stabilised matters, and became the main obstacle to change. It became one of the 
foundation stones of the ‘five principles’ outlined by Federica Mogherini, the EU’s High 
Representative  for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, in March 2016. The five principles 
were: full implementation of the Minsk agreements; closer ties with Russia’s former Soviet 
neighbours; strengthening the EU’s resilience to Russian threats; selective engagement with 
Russia on certain issues, such as counter-terrorism; and support for people-to-people 
contacts. Minsk became the cornerstone of relations between the EU and Russia, and thus 
placed an insuperable block on their improvement. This was a recipe for deadlock and 
rendered EU-Russian relations hostage to Kiev. These principles have imposed stasis in pan-
European relations, with the Ukraine-related sanctions unanimously renewed every six 
months. New ideas about relations between Russia and the EU cannot be introduced as long 
as the system is locked into the rhetoric of the implementation of the Minsk agreements.  
More broadly, there can be no return to the previous pattern of relations. ‘Business as 
usual’ had not helped avert the crisis in the first place, and it not clear what alternatives are 
available. The third Mogherini principle, resilience, was defined as a way of managing and 
suppressing threats emanating from Moscow, and thus reinforced Russia as the subaltern in 
the relationship. Russia’s implicit recognition of its subordinate position came in the much-
repeated formula that sanctions had been imposed by the EU, and therefore it was up to the 
EU to lift them. Russian formulation of alternatives to the existing pattern of relations was 
rendered illegitimate and diplomacy became no more than ritual. Russia is not a signatory of 
the Minsk Accords, and this only reinforces its marginality, with the initiative firmly in 
Western hands, even though in structural terms Russia is a major player. 
 Rather than providing a way of resolving the conflict, Minsk became the formula for 
freezing not only the war in Ukraine but the entire system of European international relations. 
This reinforced the pattern since 1991, characterised by the paucity of institutional and 
ideational innovation. Various ideas have been advanced to offer a way out for the Donbas, 
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typically drawn from the repertoire of ideas based on consociationalism. For example, in his 
meeting with Putin in March 2015, the Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi offered the 
‘South Tyrol model’, which grants the people of Trentino-Alto Adige (South Tyrol) wide 
autonomy as part of a wider Austrian-Italian settlement (Kortunov 2020). However, neither 
the international environment nor the character of Russo-Ukrainian relations is conducive to 
such a power-sharing settlement. Kiev fears that endowing the two republics with some 
permanent autonomous political status would grant them, and Moscow, leverage over 
Ukrainian politics, thus blocking Ukraine’s road to NATO membership.  
 Above all, such a deal is blocked by the defenders of the monist neo-nationalist model 
of Ukrainian statehood. These include not just ultra-nationalists such as Oleg Tyagnibok’s 
Svoboda Party and neo-fascist formations such as Azov, C14, the Social-National Assembly, 
and Revansh, but also mainstream political parties, including Yulia Tymoshenko’s Fatherland 
Party and Petro Poroshenko’s European Solidarity (Hahn 2020). Even the rather modest 
humanitarian step of restoring water supplies to Crimea and defining the war in the East as an 
internal Ukrainian conflict was met with howls of outrage. Commentators even suggested 
that such talk raised “difficult questions about the limits of democracy” (Nahaylo 2020).  
Innovation is also blocked by the stasis in the EU itself. Since 2014, it has pursued a 
‘no talk, no meeting’ approach, and although tempered in recent years, the fundamental 
principle of avoiding substantive negotiations with Moscow has held remarkably firm and is 
in conformity with Mogherini’s five principles. The ‘no talk’ policy also includes relations 
with NATO. Meetings of the NATO-Russia Council were suspended in 2014, at the time 
when they were most needed, and although they have now resumed, their limited agenda has 
turned them into little more than mutual recrimination sessions. There is no discussion of 
fundamental issues of European security. The Russian foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov 
(2020), noted that NATO leaders stated that they were open to dialogue with Russia, but by 
that they meant “an opportunity for airing their grievances against Russia, primarily over 
Ukraine”. He stressed that “NATO has nothing to do with Ukraine. We have dialogue with 
those Western countries that are engaged in Ukrainian settlement, first of all the participants 
in the Normandy format, France and Germany”. In his view, NATO only aggravated the 
issue by declaring that at some point it expected Ukraine to join the alliance. 
The European voice has been notable by its absence in even the little discussion about 
arms control agreements. The new Commission appointed in 2019 headed by Ursula van der 
Leyen argued that it would be more ‘geopolitical’, although it is not clear what is meant by 
this. If it means the assertion of the EU’s collective interests in a more ‘statist’ and assertive 
manner, then that would be a recipe for disaster; but if it means taking into account the 
national interests of others, then it could open the door to renewed dialogue and diplomacy. 
Either way, it is clear that the EU has become a weaker player, with the European Parliament 
elected in 2019 more fragmented than ever before. To compensate, the EP has been assertive 
in various directions, including a strong green agenda and decarbonisation (Entin and Entina 
2019). In September 2019 the European Parliament (2019) passed a controversial resolution 
likening the historical experience of Nazi and Soviet totalitarianism, and noted that “there is 
still an urgent need to raise awareness and carry out moral and legal assessments of the 
crimes of communist dictatorships”. The move effectively delegitimised the Soviet victory 
over Nazi Germany, and intensified the mnemonic war between Russia and Europe. The 
clash of geopolitical and ideational logics was now reinforced by a cultural struggle over 





Zelensky looks for an exit 
 
It is in this context that President Volodymyr Zelensky advanced various strategies to resolve 
the crisis. Zelensky won a landslide in the presidential election of 21 April 2019, and then on 
21 July his party, Servant of the People, gained an overwhelming majority in parliament. His 
campaign promised peace, and on this basis won overwhelming public support. His basic 
strategy was to achieve some sort of ‘grand bargain’ with Putin, over the heads of the leaders 
of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. He was critical of the Normandy format, 
suggesting the inclusion of the United States and the United Kingdom. He also suggested 
humanitarian outreach to the Ukrainians living in the breakaway territories (Kudelia 2020). 
Meeting at the UN in September, Trump showed no interest and instead advised Zelensky to 
‘get together with Putin to solve your problem’ (AP 2019). 
Soon after, Zelensky endorsed the ‘Steinmeier formula’, which stipulates the timing 
of the implementation of the law on the special status of the republics. It would come into 
effect when the polls closed after regional elections, but would only become permanent after 
the elections had been endorsed as fair by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) and in conformity with Ukrainian legislation. Russia saw the formula as a 
way of ensuring that Ukraine did not renege on the Minsk obligation to provide autonomy for 
the two regions. The acceptance of the formula on 1 October sparked the mobilisation of neo-
nationalist protest actions, with large rallies held on Maidan Square on 6 October and 8 
December. In fact, a major coalition of civic activists mobilised against Zelensky’s attempt to 
open up space for dialogue, considerably narrowing his room for manoeuvre in negotiations 
with Putin. The protest movement was reinforced by the coercive power of radical right-wing 
groups.  
However, Zelensky was supported in his endeavours by Igor Kolomoisky, the 
oligarch who had long been one of his strongest backers and whose TV channel had 
broadcast the ‘Servant of the people’ series, which had propelled the actor playing the role of 
the fictitious president (Zelensky) to national prominence. In an interview with the New York 
Times in November 2019, Kolomoisky is reported to have stated, “They’re stronger anyway. 
We have to improve our relations”, comparing Russia’s power to Ukraine’s. He went on: 
“people want peace, a good life, they don’t want to be at war. And you [referring to America] 
are forcing us to be at war, and not even giving us the money for it … You all won’t take us 
[into NATO] … There’s no use wasting time on empty talk. Whereas Russia would love to 
bring us into a new Warsaw Pact”. Kolomoisky argued that he was working hard to end the 
war, but did not give details on how, but it was clear that he now rejected the idea of a war 
against Russia to the last Ukrainian the ideology of war against Russia to the last Ukrainian 
(Troianovski 2019, 13). 
A prisoner swap in late 2019 was the first major step towards confidence-building, 
accompanied by the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from three points along the contact line. 
Then on 9 December a meeting of the Normandy Four in Paris brought Putin and Zelensky 
together for the first time, along with French President Emmanuel Macron and the German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel. The talks were held in a constructive atmosphere, with the final 
communiqué recognising that the resolution of the Donbas conflict required an improvement 
in the European regional security architecture (Utkin 2019). However, no pathway to peace 
was devised. Zelensky was accompanied in Paris by Arsen Avakov, who had been confirmed 
as minister of the interior by Zelensky, a post he had held since immediately after the change 
of regime in February 2014. Avakov effectively acted as Zelensky’s minder, ensuring that he 
did not stray too far from the monist neo-nationalist script. Even while the meeting in Paris 
was continuing, the former president, Petro Poroshenko was urging a rally in the Maidan to 
revolt against Zelensky if he gave too much away in Paris. It was clear that Zelensky’s room 
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for manoeuvre was extremely limited. He boxed himself in further following the Paris 
meeting when, at the Munich Security Conference in February 2020, he effectively endorsed 
the opposition’s ‘red lines’. These included the need to fulfil ‘security’ requirements before 
regional elections could take place, including control over the border (possibly jointly with 
the separatist forces), and that the ‘special status’ powers devolved to the republics were no 
greater than those granted to other regions (Zelensky 2020). In other words, the ‘Zelensky 
formula’ modified the timing and sequencing of the Minsk Accords. 
Direct talks with the leaders of the Russia-backed separatists in Eastern Ukraine were 
a red line bitterly opposed by the neo-nationalists and their armed formations, such as Andriy 
Biletsky’s Azov volunteer battalion and his later-established National Corps nationalist 
group. Most had been incorporated into the National Guard under Avakov, giving him the 
power to make or break elected leaders. On the other side, Zelensky appeared ready to 
cooperate with some of the ‘pro-Russian’ forces, including the former president, Leonid 
Kuchma, and possibly even Viktor Medvedchuk, whose closeness  to Putin is both an asset 
and a liability. His Opposition Platform – For Life party scored a notable success by coming 
second in the 2019 parliamentary elections with 13 per cent of the vote, although fell far short 
of Servant of the People.  
Despite the wave of criticism and his own red lines, Zelensky persevered in his peace 
efforts. In talks in Minsk on 11 March 2020 a tentative deal was struck that would give the 
DNR and LNR leaders a voice in the Minsk negotiations. This was accompanied by the idea 
of creating a National Platform for Reconciliation and Unity to promote ‘dialogue’ not only 
on the Donbas but also Crimea, as well as the other contentious areas in the West populated 
by Hungarians and others. However, follow-up meetings were cancelled because of the 
swelling coronavirus crisis. The Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) talks in Minsk were 
mediated by the OSCE and brought together two new actors: Andriy Yermak, Zelensky’s 
chief of staff, and Dmitry Kozak, Putin’s long-term fixer and new point man on Ukrainian 
issues (replacing Vladislav Surkov on 11 February). Yermak helped organise the prisoner 
exchanges in late 2019, and his promotion to Zelensky’s staff on 11 February raised fears 
among neo-nationalists about a softening of the line. The Consultative Council would have 
seats allotted to ‘authorised representatives’ of the unrecognised republics, with 10 
representatives of Ukraine and 10 from the two republics, and a member each from four 
observers: Russia, Germany, France, and the OSCE. All decisions would have to be approved 
by three-quarters of the representatives and would be considered advisory rather than 
binding. The main purpose of the Council would be “to conduct and develop proposals for 
political and legal solutions towards the settlement of the conflict” (Weselowsky 2020). 
For the first time the political agency of the republics was recognised, prompting a 
wave of criticism. The Kyiv Post talked of “Zelensky’s road to capitulation”. It argued that 
Poroshenko understood something in any “peaceful resolution” with the Russians that 
Zelensky did not: “Never ever give even the slightest concession, because that will never 
bring peace, but simply an escalating demand for more” (Woloshyn 2020). The language of 
‘appeasement’ was applied at this time, raising some fundamental questions about when it is 
appropriate to negotiate and when to stand up to a tyrant. If Russia’s resistance to the post-
Cold War expansionist logic is considered irrational, likewise its opposition to what it 
considers the ‘coup’ in Kiev in February 2014, then it was logical to counter its actions by all 
possible means. James Sherr, the veteran analyst of Ukrainian affairs, noted that these 
“unsettling events” [the discussions in Minsk] vindicated those who from the outset 
considered “Zelensky as all show and no substance”, exposing his shortcomings of character 
and inability to manage external pressures amid failure to grasp “the existential nature of the 




There are also empirical obstacles. First, although the political subjectivity of the 
breakaway regions was acknowledged, matters there had progressed much further than Kiev 
allowed. The two republics, although beset by profound problems, have established the 
rudiments of statehood. Not only do the administrations function in the manner of states, 
delivering public services and goods, but they have also gained a degree of allegiance of their 
citizens. The original separatist aspirations were always more than simply a Russian-backed 
insurgency (Matveeva 2016, 2017). Russophone identity was now reinforced by access to 
Russian passports. Any deal would have to make provision for the legal protection of 
regional elites and citizens who believed their fate (like that of Crimea) lay with Russia. 
Second, Zelensky’s ‘red lines’ contained unrealistic conditions about the sequencing of 
conflict resolution measures. Understandably, Kiev wanted to ensure that any vote in the 
republics was a genuine expression of popular desires, but to stipulate the complete 
withdrawal of Russian forces before the vote removed the one force that provided security 
guarantees to the republic’s elites, although the introduction of some third (neutral) force has 
sometimes been mooted. Third, Zelensky’s plans failed to provide for the genuine devolution 
of powers as well as guarantees that any power-sharing measures could not be unilaterally 
revoked. Zelensky found himself trapped: moves towards a sustainable resolution of the 
conflict enraged the neo-nationalist opposition at home; but failure to achieve some sort of 
peace undermined his popular support. 
 Putin’s room for manoeuvre is also constrained by Communist and nationalist 
movements on his right, demanding that Russia defend compatriots in Ukraine. There is 
pressure for Moscow to recognise the two Donbas republics, a step that Putin is loath to 
undertake. They even call for Russia to intervene militarily in an open and direct manner, 
thus throwing down the gauntlet to the West (Beebe 2019, 118). In structural terms there was 
little scope for Russia to change its approach. As Andrei Tsygankov (2019) notes, “Ukraine 
has turned into an international systemic problem at the stage of transition to a new world 
order. … Ukraine [made] the results of the 1991 referendum the basis for the path to Europe 
without Russia (and at the same time at the expense of Russia). Today, this path has 
degenerated into a movement to embrace Europe as a result of anti-Russian sentiment”. From 
this perspective, the model of Ukrainian state building since 1991, combining de-




The present status quo is unsustainable, but so are all of its alternatives. There is a profound 
desire for peace in Ukraine, yet mobilised civil society (with a large part of the most active 
NGOs funded by Western governments and foundations) is threatening a new Maidan if 
Zelensky makes the concessions essential for a peace order to be created. A change of regime 
in Kiev that brings to power ‘pro-Russian’ forces is unlikely, although in a situation of 
economic collapse and political turmoil, it cannot be excluded. Even then, regime collapse in 
Kiev would only intensify domestic civil conflict. Equally, Putin cannot give up the two 
republics without a negotiated settlement. Russia would be perceived globally as an 
unreliable partner, and Putin’s own position would be challenged by domestic nationalist 
mobilisation. In this impossible situation, millions of Ukrainians are taking the ‘exit’ option 
(Simes 2020). Believing that there is no solution to the problem, they exit the problem itself. 
The confrontation over Ukraine and European security dilemmas more broadly have entered 
a dead end in which there appear to be no viable exit routes. However, all wars in the end 
come to some sort of conclusion, and there is no reason to believe that our case will be the 
exception – however long it takes. There four possible ways out.  
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The first is for Russia to accept the hegemony of the Liberal International Order, 
including the Atlantic power system at its core. This is the scenario advanced by radical 
liberals in Russia and their allies in the West. A new leader takes over from Putin, and 
pursues some sort of second perestroika. Domestically, this means wholesale ‘reform’, with 
the mass privatisation of state-owned enterprises and the retreat of the statist industrial policy 
pursued in the Putin years. In foreign policy it would mean accepting, finally, the expansive 
logic of liberal hegemony. Russia would finally be welcomed gratefully into the bosom of the 
Western power system, but no longer as a great power with national interests and geopolitical 
priorities of its own, but a as subaltern element. Russia, in other words, would finally 
embrace the ‘defeat’ that it had so stubbornly refused to since the early 1990s. In the most 
benign reading, this would make Russia the equivalent of a France or Germany, a post-
imperial state building relations with its neighbours on the basis of equality and rule-based 
interactions. Moscow would abandon the two Donbas republics to their fate, while the 
Crimea question would be shelved – even the most liberal and Westernising government 
would find it impossible to return Crimea to Ukrainian jurisdiction, above all because it 
would run counter to the freely-expressed wishes of the Crimean population (Toal et al. 
2020). State and society within Russia would finally be reconciled, the power of the security 
agencies restrained, the independence of the courts recognised, and the traditional 
‘guardianship’ ideology of the regime rendered redundant. The entrepreneurial energies of 
the people would no longer be constrained by the threat of reiderstvo, and boom years would 
follow. A rather more pessimistic reading suggests some sort of repeat of the 1990s, with the 
social guarantees advanced by the Putin system undermined, and the rise of a new form of 
oligarchic capitalism. 
The second is for the exact opposite. Instead of the dominance of the expansionist 
logic, let us imagine if the transformational logic embedded in the promise of 1989 had been 
fulfilled. A number of potential openings would have been explored. First, instead of the 
ideology of ‘Europe whole and free’, which explicitly challenged Gorbachev’s formulation of 
a Common European Home, the pan-continental idea of Greater Europe would have been 
given institutional form. The Gaullist-Mitterandist idea of a confederation of Europe would 
perhaps have begun with a very loose Euro-Asian Commission, and then developed certain 
functional prerogatives, with the anticipated spill-over effects. Second, in the early 1990s 
there had been some discussion about creating some sort of European Security Council 
within the framework of what became, in December 1994, the OSCE. In the event, the plans 
were blocked, and the OSCE became a relatively marginal security organisation, dealing with 
conflict management (notably in the Donbas) and monitoring normative compliance with the 
human rights and democracy agenda. Third and above all, the logic of reconciliation would 
have prevailed across the continent, avoiding the dilemma of the ‘lands in between’, trapped 
between the expanding Atlantic power system and Russia’s resistance. Conflicts over the 
‘shared neighbourhood’ would have been avoided, and instead a cooperative logic of 
functional interdependence established. The Cold War alliance system in the form of NATO 
would gradually have become redundant. The promise of 1989 would have been fulfilled. 
In a distinctive way, the post-Atlanticist element of this (although not the pan-
continental part) was part of the Trump administration’s project. President Donald Trump 
was ready to walk away from the Atlantic power system that his predecessors since 1945 had 
been so assiduously building. Even seasoned political commentators argue that “The decline 
of Europe as a force in world affairs and the shift of the axis of world politics to the Indo-
Pacific are realities that American foreign policy cannot ignore. The liberal Atlanticist 
consensus cannot guide American foreign policy going forward, and new ways of thinking 
and acting will have to be found” (Mead 2019). In ideological terms, Trump repudiated the 
fundamental principle on which US foreign policy had been based, effectively since the 
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foundation of the state, namely the idea of America as the ‘exceptional’ nation. The practical 
consequences were clear. As far as Trump is concerned, multilateral organisations and 
commitments undermine America’s ability to advance its national interests, and thus he tried 
to make the US one selfish state among others (Krastev and Holmes 2019, 146). However, 
the ‘Trumanite’ national security state ensured that his ability to reshape the security structure 
has been stymied (Glennon 2015). Trump’s personal commitment to a grand bargain with 
Russia (designed largely to enlist Russian support in the major confrontation with China) has 
been blocked.  
It was entirely natural that Trump’s impeachment in 2019 took place over Ukrainian 
issues. In his telephone call of 25 July with Zelensky, Trump apparently threatened to 
suspend $391 million in military assistance and a visit to the White House unless Ukraine 
opened an investigation into former vice president Joe Biden’s Ukrainian activities and 
possible Ukrainian meddling in the 2016 election (Memorandum 2019; Jenkins 2019). The 
case focused on whether Trump tried to blackmail Zelensky to gain electoral advantage over 
the probable Democrat contender for the presidency. However, as Nancy Pelosi, the leader of 
the House of Representatives who on 26 September triggered the impeachment hearing, 
admitted in December, “This isn’t about Ukraine. It’s about Russia … who benefited by our 
withholding of that military assistance? Russia. It’s about Russia … All roads lead to Putin. 
Understand that” (Mascaro and Jalonick 2019). Almost all the witness testimony assumed 
that the US was at war with Russia and that Trump had committed treason on behalf of a 
hostile state, and that the president’s attempts to conduct a foreign policy at odds with the 
national security state lacked a democratic mandate (Tracey 2020). The former National 
Security Council official Tim Morrison (2019), on the third day of the impeachment hearing 
on 19 November, argued that “The United States aids Ukraine and her people so that they can 
fight Russia over there, and we don’t have to fight Russia over here”. The assertion was 
repeated by Adam Schiff, the head of the House Intelligence Committee, in his marathon 
opening statement in the Senate impeachment trial, arguing that “The Kremlin showed boldly 
in 2016 that with the malign skills it honed in Ukraine, they would not stay in Ukraine. 
Instead, Russia employed them here to attack our institutions, and they will do so again”. In 
other words, Trump had to be impeached not because of constitutional infringements but 
because he was part of a Russian conspiracy to undermine US security, spread 
disinformation, undermine faith in US intelligence agencies, and to ‘remake the map of 
Europe by dint of military force’. The Democratic Party “was regrouping along the most 
retrograde Cold War lines” (Lazare 2020). 
Renewed Cold War confrontation has now become part of the sinews of American 
foreign policy, and confrontation is here to stay with very limited room for US-Russian 
cooperation in the foreseeable future. Ukraine is the cornerstone of the conflict, with Moscow 
perceiving US policies in Ukraine as largely ‘aimed at diminishing Russia through 
undermining its great power position’, in line with Zbigniew Brzezinski’s argument of the 
early 1990s that Russia without Ukraine cannot be an empire (Trenin 2020a). Henry 
Kissinger has long argued that “ultimate negotiation success depends upon the validity of 
your most basic assumptions, about the world, the situation, and your interests” (in Allyn 
2019). In the absence of consensus on even basic issues such as the validity of arms control 
and the balance to be drawn between ‘values’ and ‘interests’, diplomacy has become hostage 
to short-term punitive actions and reactions. Kissinger distanced himself from the views of 
liberal interventionist Democrats and neoconservative Republicans who argued after 2014 
that Russia must be ‘punished’ for its actions in Ukraine, whose voices were greatly 
amplified after Russia’s alleged interference in the 2016 US presidential election. Instead, he 
argued that the US should place limits on the definition of its national interests and that it 
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cannot afford “to prioritize the isolation or weakening of Russia, let alone push for Russian 
collapse” (Allyn 2019). 
The third way out (in part overlapping with the Trumpian transactional agenda) is 
great power summitry. It is under this heading that the idea of some sort of ‘grand bargain’ is 
mooted, in which the major powers (including China) come together to resolve specific issues 
as well as the ‘rules of the road’. This is an unabashed ‘geopolitical’ approach, in which 
pragmatic deal-making takes priority over normative considerations. Dmitry Trenin, the 
Director of the Carnegie Moscow Centre, notes that a new strategic balance can only be 
achieved through settlement of the Ukraine crisis. The preconditions for this “are the 
recognition of Crimea’s status as Russian territory and the reintegration of Donbass with 
Ukraine on the basis of the Minsk Accords of 2015”. At the same time, “Ukraine would 
become a country neutral to both the US/NATO and Russia and an associated partner of the 
European Union with an opportunity to further develop its relations with the EU” (Trenin 
2020b). Others have argued for a grand bargain to be struck between Moscow and 
Washington over Crimea, while bracketing the Donbas conflict until some more propitious 
time for settlement emerges (Goldstein 2019). As a presidential candidate Trump argued that 
it was possible for Crimea to go back to Russia, but this was just another of his statements 
that inflamed the national security establishment (DeRensis 2019). 
Listing these items demonstrates just how hard it would be to achieve a grand bargain, 
even if there was the will to do so. The harsh reaction to the rather modest proposals 
advanced in a report by the Euro-Atlantic Security Leadership Group is testimony to that. 
They suggested breaking the Ukrainian problem into component parts, with security, 
humanitarian, economic, and political steps, with signatories drawn from across the spectrum 
including retired General Philip Breedlove, the former NATO Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe (Twelve Steps 2020). Presented to the February 2020 Munich Security Forum, the 
organisers were forced to remove the report from the MSF website. Given the renewed binary 
logic of the confrontation over Ukraine this was perfectly logical, but given the dangers of 
nuclear confrontation and the remilitarisation of Europe, such a sharp rejection of putative 
peace plans was far from rational. 
This coincides in part with the fourth option, the primacy of sovereign 
internationalism combined with respect for the normative foundations (international law). 
This is precisely the model established at Yalta, in which the great powers pursued their own 
interests while at the same time creating the UN system. As far as Russia is concerned, its 
realist approach follows the logic of power, but any logical system has its limits, at which 
point it becomes irrational. In an important interview the Russian defence minister, Sergei 
Shoigu (2019), argued that the West showed its hand too soon in the early 1990s – intended 
to drive home its victory against Russia, and thus alerted it in time to prepare a response, in 
the form of Primakov’s competitive coexistence strategy. Shoigu pushed ahead with the 
transformation of Russia’s armed forces based on the logic of an adversarial relationship with 
the West. At the same time, Putin has drawn from classic realist theory about the dangers of 
overstretch (Wohlforth 2016, 35-53). 
There is possibly a fifth option, based on the sovereign internationalism and 
diplomatic practices of the fourth. Crisis reinforces the role of the state as well as the need for 
international cooperation, and this was in evidence at the time of the coronavirus pandemic in 
2020. Solidarity in the face of a common external challenge has forced erstwhile adversaries 
to ally, as in the Second World War, and there were signs of this at the time of Covid-19. 
Three former US ambassadors to Ukraine argued that the crisis was an opportunity to end the 
war in Ukraine, and argued that “the United States and its allies should offer to lift 
international sanctions against Russia if Putin will end his military incursions into Ukraine” 
(Taylor et al. 2020). The idea was a positive one, but the way that it was formulated means 
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that it stood no chance of being implemented. As humourists argue, the only realistic option 
of bringing the sides together in the face of a common challenge is a visitation of hostile 




The great power alignment at Yalta soon gave way to the division of Europe and the onset of 
the Cold War. The aspiration embedded in 1989 was to move beyond the logic of Yalta, but 
once again we have ended up where we began. The various exits appear a mirage. From this 
perspective, the exit route from the First Cold War was relatively straightforward – one side 
or the other would give up the ideological gauntlet and converge on a single model of 
modernity. Convergence theory in the 1970s assumed that this would take the form of some 
sort of middle way, with the West and the Soviet model of socialism each in their own way 
becoming social democratic. Although Gorbachev believed in some form of reform 
communism, returning to the 1968 Czechoslovak ideas of ‘socialism with a human face’, in 
the end this proved 20 years too late and unsustainable, and Russia took the path of a more 
radically market-centred model of the West itself. At the same time, the First Cold War was 
marked by various periods of détente, whereas the current one remains permanently mired in 
confrontation, although not excluding elements of cooperation. Trump certainly sought some 
kind of détente, but he was stymied in this ambition, and any Democratic successor will 
return to a more hostile approach. Exit routes from the Second Cold War are less predictable, 
although theoretically they should be far easier. After all, there is no entrenched ideological 
conflict, no struggle over territories (other than clashing integration projects in ‘the lands in 
between’), and leaderships that meet regularly at G20 and other forums.  
However, the renewed Cold War is far more intractable, and with it options for the 
resolution of the Ukraine syndrome, for a number of reasons. First, unlike the Soviet Union, 
Russia has relatively little agency in its ability to end the confrontation. The logic of the 
confrontation between expansion and transformation is absolute – there is no easily 
identifiable middle path. Either one side or the other has to capitulate. As long as Putin is 
leader there will be no capitulation, and hence the conflict will continue. It is also almost 
certain that his successor will pursue largely the same policies, since Putin’s policies, in the 
main, reflect a solid consensus among the Russian elite. 
Second, the lack of agency has yet another dimension. Although Russia throughout 
the crisis since 2014 has declared its willingness to cooperate, and it welcomed Macron’s 
overtures in 2019, the EU as a hegemon is not ready to revise its view of Russia’s position in 
the international system. Mogherini’s five principles defined ‘resilience’ in terms of dealing 
with threats from Russia, and thus undercut the basis of normal interstate diplomacy. Russia 
seeks to base its foreign policy on the principle of sovereign internationalism, but when faced 
by the EU this became increasingly impossible. The actorness of the member states was 
undermined when it came to relations with Russia, while policy by the EU institutions 
became dependent on Ukraine’s allies, many of whom advocated tough policies on Russia, in 
part as a consequence of the Soviet legacy of domination.  
The Ukraine crisis reflects the larger crisis in the post-Cold War European security 
order. The tension between the logics of expansion and transformation has turned out not to 
be a contradiction, which is susceptible to resolution, but an antinomy – which cannot be 
resolved. The Ukraine syndrome of unstable internal development combined with its 
internationalisation threatens world politics with ‘Ukrainisation’ (Leibin 2020). Populist and 
militant insurgency at home combined with the weaponisation of international instruments by 
warring parties makes the Second Cold War far more unstable and unpredictable than the 
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first. No side can make concessions without losing face amidst the logic in which their post-
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